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The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for
Today?
The George P. Smith, II Distinguished Visiting Professorship Lecture
April 4, 2003

JANET McLEAN*
INTRODUCTION

An estimated twenty-nine to fifty-one of the world's 100 largest economic
entities are multinational companies; the remainder are nation states. The gross
domestic production of sub-Saharan Africa does not equal the revenues of General
Motors and Ford combined.' Lawyers may observe these facts, but lack legal
classifications with which to deal with them. In our liberal legal tradition, no matter
how powerful transnational corporations may become, they are not states and
should not be subjected to the same legal obligations and duties as states. Their
private rights are deserving of protection and their private obligations are
demanding enough. Our familiar forms of legal classification, it seems, cannot take
us much further. We do not have the concepts with which to deal with private
aggregations of power.
Corporations and states are commonly represented as having an oppositional
relationship. Corporations represent the private; states represent the public.
Corporations represent the efficient, the natural, and the spontaneous; states
represent the inefficient and the contrived. The ascendancy of the corporation
means the decline of the state. But these commonly held views are ahistorical and
tend to ignore the complex relationships between states and corporations. Modem
incorporation is simply a matter of fulfilling formal registration requirements.
There are few surviving remnants of the old notion that incorporation is a privilege
conferred by the state. This Article aims to redress the balance somewhat by telling
aspects of the history of the corporate form that have been obscured by modem
forms of incorporation and modem conceptions of the public and the private. In a
modest way this Article intends to show just how recent the public/private
paradigm actually is and how selectively such concepts have been applied.
This Article forms part of a larger project that seeks to evaluate how much the
"new" phenomenon of globalization is a continuation of the processes of
colonization. The history of colonial expansion is capable of being viewed as a
history of the corporate form. This larger project seeks to assess the part that ideas
of legal personality have played in these processes. In legal terms, nations, peoples,
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and economic entities have not always enjoyed the status of unified and permanent
entities bearing rights and duties. Many collective entities that we would consider
to exist as social, or economic, beings have not enjoyed legal recognition as distinct
entities. Whether or not collectivities have enjoyed distinct legal identity has been
crucial.
Part I will relate a narrative of the trading corporation and how the public/
private distinction plays out within that history. Its purpose is to paint in rather
broad strokes a picture about the use and consequence of different legal forms. In
covering such a broad period of history, there is a risk of over generalization and
over simplification in the pursuit of general trends and themes. The citing of
specific, if diverse, examples will allow the reader some opportunity for testing the
plausibility of these broader claims. The purpose of Part II is to consider whether
there are parallels to be drawn between colonial processes and the modem world
order and lessons to be learnt from this history about the relationships between
corporations and states today.
I. A HISTORICAL NARRATiVE
A. The Early Joint-Stock Companies

The corporation in its historic and modem forms has this as its essence: It is
conceived in law as an artificial legal person whose personality is separate from its
constituent members. Separate legal personality usually brings with it a separate
management hierarchy. Limited liability-often viewed as a sine qua non of the
corporation-did not become an established feature of the corporate form until the
late eighteenth century.2
The legal concept of the corporation was first applied to the King himself (or
at least to the abstract and perpetual aspect of the kingdom). Households, guilds,
universities, Inns of Court, convents, charitable foundations and cities were among
the early medieval corporations. 3 One might even be tempted to suggest that it was
the public that gave the corporate legal form to the private,4 but that would be
hopelessly anachronistic, not to say misleading.
The terms "public" and "private" cannot meaningfully describe the legal
categories at that time. By the later Tudor period, the grant of incorporation was
firmly established as part of the King's exclusive prerogative and could not be

2. RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS

ORGANIZATION 1720-1844, at 23-24 (2000). Limited liability was not necessary for the early
corporation because it usually held assets in land and its exposure to tortious liability was
low. In any event, the liability of each corporation depended on the terms of its charter. By
the late seventeenth century, there is evidence of some sort of limited liability being
available which protected shareholders from being arrested for the debts of the company. Id.
at 127-29.
3. A.W. Brian Simpson, How the Corporation Conquered John Bull, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1591, 1591 (2002).
4. I have discussed elsewhere how subsequently private law may have given the
corporate form back to the state. See generally Janet McLean, The Crown in Contract and
Administrative Law, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (2004).
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acquired by long usage or prescription.5 All incorporation depended on a direct,
explicit, and ex ante authorization by the King in charter or letters patent.
Corporation law was in those days categorized by lawyers as part of the Law of the
King. 6 Corporations were artificial persons created by the King. Corporations were
not spontaneous, voluntary, or aggregated natural persons. The corporate form was
not originally used for business Vurposes. Indeed, business favored the partnership
form where the people were real.
In the late sixteenth century, this began to change. For the first time, the
corporate form was used in risky "for profit" ventures. It is on these "for profit"
forms of corporations that we shall focus. The vast majority of these were
incorporated for overseas trade. They were our first "transnational corporations" if
you will. In the first two decades of the seventeenth century, some forty companies
were granted trading monopolies by their respective governments over much of the
known world. Among the seventeenth century British companies were the British8
East India Company, the Hudson's Bay Company, the Royal African Company
and the London and Plymouth companies established by James I under the Charter
of Virginia.
A central characteristic of these corporations was that they were granted
monopoly powers by their respective governments. The English corporations were
typically granted a monopoly over English trade that encompassed specified
territory abroad. Additionally, the corporations received power to protect their
monopoly and rights over English subjects within the territory. 9 The grant of
monopoly status encouraged investors to engage in often highly risky ventures. For
the first time, money could be raised in return for shares, profits could be divided
among shareholders, and shares could be transferred among members and
outsiders. Importantly, new investors among the gentry could be involved in
business enterprises alongside the merchants. 10 Profit was the dominant motive of
most of these companies and the commercial risk was high.
These organizations also had other more public purposes. They became the
major source of public finance by which the monarch could raise revenue without
Parliament and at the same time further foreign policy on a self-funding basis."
The costs of embassies, overseas representatives, fortifications, and sometimes,
even wars, would be borne by the corporations themselves. They were an important
instrument of settlement and colonization.

5. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 17. Blackstone and Kyd, writing in the eighteenth century,
found two ancient modes of creating corporations that did not require explicit Crown grant.
They were by prescription (in the case of the City of London) and by the common law (in
the case of bishops and deans). These modes were only available in those cases in which the
corporations had existed since time immemorial. Id.
6. See Sm JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND,

JURISPRUDENCE

347-55 (7th ed. 1924).

7. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 20.
8. Chartered in 1672, it held a monopoly over the British slave trade between West
Africa and the West Indies. "Free" trade in slaves came in 1712 and from then until 1759 the
company ran coastal forts for the British government.
9. This was established in East India Co. v. Sandys, 90 Eng. Rep. 103 (1684).
10. See

THEODORE K.

RABB, ENTERPRISE AND EMPIRE; MERCHANT AND GENTRY

INVESTMENT IN THE EXPANSION OF ENGLAND, 1575-1630 (1967).

11. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 41, 46. James I and Charles I were particularly attracted to
this revenue earning device. Id. Until 1719, unincorporated joint-stock companies were
liable for prosecution for breaching the King's prerogative. Id. at 58.
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The London and Plymouth companies, for example, used the legal form of the
trading company for the purposes of political and religious self-government. They
enjoyed sovereign powers. Chartered in 1603, they were empowered to fortify
territory, coin money, and to impose customs duties.' 2 Anyone who attempted to
settle the territory without the corporation's consent could be expelled and those
who committed certain crimes could be outlawed.' 3 Under the terms of their
charters, lands in the prescribed territories were to be held by the companies
"of the
14
King under the assumption that they formed part of an English manor."'
At that time, "State territory was still, as in the Middle Ages, more or less
identified with the private property of the monarch of the state."' 15 Rights of
dwellers and cultivators were derived from the private and exclusive ownership of
the Lord. 16 Imperium (the antecedent of the modem concept of sovereignty) and
dominium (the antecedent of the modem concept of private ownership) were
blurred during this transition from feudalism to territorial sovereignty. Feudal ties
cut across national borders.' 7 The North American settlements were considered to
be dependent and subject to the realm of England. It was by this feudal conception
that the King, through his delegate the Company, could acquire the land and
sovereignty. That sovereignty was initially personal-giving the King or his
delegate powers over the settlers alone. It later evolved into a kind of territorial
sovereignty.18 It was the corporation that exercised powers of imperium on his
behalf, but always against the background possibility that its charters would not be
renewed or would be withdrawn by the Crown.19
Charting the public and the private during this period was hazardous. Trade
was closely connected to the law of the sea. It drew distinctions that we might be
tempted to roughly approximate to the modem public/private divide. Pirates were
unlawful, yet privateers were a lawful institution. The privateer was a commander
of a private commercial ship who was authorized by the state to participate in

12. See M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (1926).
13. Id.
14. Id. The lands "were to be held of the king in free and common socage, as of the
manor of East Greenwich, and not [the more onerous] in capite." This meant the company
could sub-grant the land under its seal. Viola Florence Barnes, Land Tenure in English
Colonial Chartersof the Seventeenth Century, in ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY PRESENTED
5, 14 (1931).
15. According to Oppenheim about Grotius. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 545
(H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955), quoted in YEHUDA Z. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1965). Grotius was legal advisor to the Dutch East India Company.
16. SIR PAUL VINOGRADOFF, THE GROWTH OF THE MANOR 308 (2d ed. 1951).
17. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 22 (1958).
TO CHARLES MCLEAN ANDREWS BY HIS STUDENTS

18. Imperium was initially understood to be personal. The East India Company, for
example, initially exercised governance only over British subjects and its own servants. As
its factories, forts, and factory towns grew, the scope of governance also increased. By East
India Company Letters Patent 1726, the Company's imperium was extended to all persons
within certain Company territories. See P.G. McHugh, The Aboriginal Rights of the New
Zealand Maori at Common Law 20 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Cambridge) (on file with author). No great extent of territory was acquired by the East India
Company until the middle of the eighteenth century. GEORGE CAWSTON & A. H. KEANE,
THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES, A.D. 1296-1858, at 120 (1968) (1896).
19. The Virginia Charters expired in 1624 and 1635.
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"armed commercial ventures" by letters of marIue from the King or Admiralty. 20
Pirates were considered criminals or outlaws.' Privateers, on the other hand,
performed important public services when they intercepted ships, seized their
cargos, and aided naval blockades. The presence of delegated authority from the
sovereign seems to be the point of distinction between the lawful privateer and the
unlawful pirate.
Closer inspection reveals that the pirate/privateer distinction may have its
origins in an analogy to the laws of war and the laws of aliens, rather than in an
embryonic form of the public/private distinction. Privateering originally served the
purpose of self-defense. 22 Pirates were outlaws because they were effectively
denationalized and did not belong to a flag state.23 The difficulty throughout this
period is to resist the tendency to see what we, through our modem lenses, are
expecting to see.
The main point for our purposes is that during the early period trading
corporations operated in a feudal context. The public/private distinction, as we
understand it today, did not operate during that period. The British corporations
were vested with sovereign powers according to the terms of their Charterspowers which they could augment and renew upon application to the King. The
acquisition of an overseas territory by a trading corporation, vested with sovereign
powers, automatically transferred feudal conceptions of ownership of land and
governance over British subjects in that territory. International law ideas about
territorial sovereignty were yet to grow out of these feudal conceptions. At the
same time, very modem developments were taking 2 lace in the establishment of
the earliest progenitors of the joint-stock company. Innovative new methods of
raising capital for risky "adventures" through experiments with the corporate form
were being discovered. These were not the products of liberal ideology but of a
much earlier mindset.
B. Spanning the Different Periods: The English East India Company
Ron Harris argues that from 1720 the linkages between the business
corporation, the overseas trade monopoly system, and public finance loosened. 25 It
is certainly even more difficult to generalize about the scope and scale of the
trading companies in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Political
troubles at home caused inconsistencies in both the granting and enforcement of

20. WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 305 (Michael Byers
trans., 2000).
21. Id.
22. See id. at 313.
23. Id. at 306.
24. ARTHUR BERRIEDALE KEITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF INDIA, 1600-1935, at 4
(1936). Keith puts the date at which the East India Company moved from the old "regulated
company" to the joint-stock company form at 1612. Id.; see also HARRIS supra note 2, at 25;
Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, in CUvE M. SCHM1rHOFF'S
SELECT ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 674 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., 1988) (discussing
the earlier history of the joint-stock companies). According to Hunter, the words "Joint
Stock" first appear in the Royal Charter of 1686. He also notes that at various times in its
history, there was pressure for the company to return to a regulated form. See 2 Sm W.W.
HUNTER, A HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA 118, 120 (1900).
25. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 58.
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monopolies.26 There was a struggle between the Crown and Parliament about
which institution should grant the privilege of incorporation. Many of the old
trading companies disappeared, failed, or were taken over by the British Crown.
Harris argues that the connection between the corporation and the State
dwindled after 1720 is not entirely convincing for two reasons. For the purposes of
his argument, he treats the English East India Company and the Hudson's Bay
Company as anomalies. 27 The East India Company may have been one of the few
trading corporations to survive from the early period, but it was one of the most
important corporations financially, as an experiment in the joint-stock company
form, and in terms of its contribution to imperial history. Moreover, both the
English East India Company and the Hudson's Bay Company survived until the
middle of the nineteenth century with varying levels of interference from the
state. 28 The nineteenth century saw the revival of the trading company form for the
purposes of colonial expansion. This second wave of colonization by trading
companies in 1815-1870"9 is partly outside the period of the Harris inquiry. It is
hard to resist, however, the suggestion that the continued existence of these two
great trading companies may have contributed to the nineteenth century revival of
the'form. It may well be that the existence of a corporation exercising mixed
entrepreneurial and governmental functions cannot help but look anomalous to
modem eyes. To excise these corporations from the general history of the corporate
form, as Harris and others tend to do, does not do justice to the contributions of
such trading enterprises.
Compared with the French trading companies generally, the English and Dutch
companies were considered to be much more independent and able to operate at
arms length from their respective governments. 30 The agents of the Dutch and
English companies were regarded as employees and servants of groups of
merchants, rather than the subordinates of their governments. The British
considered themselves traders first and territorial rulers second. 31 Of course, the
proper mix of the East India Company's functions was contested, tended to be in
the eye of the beholder, and changed dramatically over the period of the company's
existence. In 1615, some commentators regarded the British East India Company as
insufficiently representative of the British Nation and its aspirations. According to
Rabb, "Discussions of national prestige [within the British East India Company]

26. The Statute of Monopolies, enacted in 1623, made an exception for existing
monopolies and trading companies. See 21 Jam. 1, c.3, § 9 (Eng.).
27. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 45, 53-59, 204-07.
28. GREWE, supra note 20, at 300. The Hudson's Bay Company was privileged in 1670;
in 1749, Parliament discussed its abrogation; and in 1859, its trade monopoly was abolished.
It continued to exercise its political and administrative powers for another ten years. Id.
29. 1 adopt Koskenneimi's view here. MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLER CIVILZER
OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 110-12 n.63 (2002).
30. GREwE, supra note 20, at 301. Grewe describes the seventy-five French companies
between 1599-1789 as the "artificial products of a clearly conceived political will of [the]
State" and as lacking the private individualistic spirit of enterprise of the English and Dutch.
Id.
31. K.N. CHAUDHURI, THE TRADING WORLD OF ASIA AND THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA
COMPANY, 1660-1760, at 115 (1978). At various times in its history, accusations were made
that the company's handsome profits "were made at the expense of the nation." See SIR
PERCIvAL GRIFFITHS, A LICENSE TO TRADE: THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH CHARTERED
COMPANIES (1974).
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were entirely absent: in fact, it had to be reminded by the government of its
national obligations; and even the tracts written on its behalf dealt more with
economics than glory." 32 A century later, the British East India Company Directors
were reporting that "the Company traded more for the benefit of the nation
[England] than for itself."33 Its importance to the public revenue is undeniable.
When the two rival British East India Companies were united in 1709, their entire
permanent capital of three million 3Founds was loaned to the Crown and the
company traded on borrowed funds. Capital was often "violently withdrawn" to
serve the State's needs. 35 In a perhaps predictable reversal of this trend, the
Company's application to the Government for a loan of one million pounds in 1772
led to the enactment of the Regulating Act of 1773. 36 This would be a decisive step
in the37deepening involvement of the British government in the administration of
India.

The British East India Company certainly took advantage of its ambiguous
status-successfully emphasizing its sovereign powers when it wished to avoid
contractual debts to local rulers, 38 protesting to the Royal Navy that its status would
be reduced in the eyes of the locals if it had to acknowledge the superiority of the
British naval fleet, 39 and all the time relying for its trading advantage on the might
of British naval power and on the calculated and limited use of force. It charged
merchants fees for safe passage 4 and was able to do so as an exercise of its
monopoly and sovereign powers. It was graphically and finally reminded of its
subordinate status, however, when Queen Victoria took over from the company in
1858. 4 1 The company had survived in various guises and with mixed public and
private motives for 250 years. 42

32.

RABB,

supra note 10, at 39-40. Rabb attributes this lack of nationalism to the higher

participation of merchants than gentlemen in this joint-stock, as compared, for example, with
the Virginia Company. Id. at 39.
33. CHAUDHURI, supra note 31, at 121.
34. Id. at 120.
35. WILLIAM ROBERT ScOTT, COLLECTED ARTICLES RELATING TO THE CONSTITUTION

AND FINANCE OF BRMSH AND IRISH JOINT STOCK COMPANIES UP TO 1720, at 199 (1910).
36. JOHN KEAY, THE HONOURABLE COMPANY: A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA
COMPANY 384 (1994).
37. Id. at 384-91.
38. See Nabob of Arcot v. East India Co., 29 Eng. Rep. 841 (Ch. 1793) (holding that a
bill could not be maintained by a sovereign prince in India against the East India Company
for an account).
39. CHAUDHURI, supra note 31, at 109. The company protested to London that
acknowledging the superiority of the British naval fleet "lessened the status of the
Company's servants in the eyes of the Indian political rulers." Id.
40. Id. at 121.
41.

JEREMY BERNSTEIN,

DAWNING OF THE RAI: THE LIFE AND TRIALS OF WARREN

HASTINGS 285 (2000). In 1858, the Government of India Act transferred all the Company's
rights to the Crown. Id. This was only one in a series of Acts of Parliament which foretold
the British East India Company's eventual dissolution. The first was the Regulating Act of
1773, which declared all acquisitions made by the company to belong to the Crown
(describing these as having formerly been vested in or exercised by the company in trust for
the Queen). It was followed by the 1784 India Act and the 1813 Charter Acts. See KEAY,
supra note 36, at 393; LINDLEY, supra note 12, at 95.
42. KEAY, supra note 36, at 9, 393. James Mill (who worked for the company) argued
that the trading and "sovereign" functions should be separated. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 205-

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:363

Under eighteenth century English law, there was still no explicit conception of
the corporation as a public or private person. Shares held in a corporation were not
considered a protectable property right and there was no distinction between the
public or private monopoly. The larger a corporation, the more likely the state
would interfere.43 Shares of corporations of all kinds were held by private
shareholders and traded on the stock exchange. 44 The corporation as a legal form
for business enterprise gained strength during this period, long predating
industrialization.
C. Nineteenth Century Revival
The next wave of overseas trading corporations was in the nineteenth
century.45 The experience of companies such as the British East India Company
had by then helped establish the corporate form as the dominant form of business
association. The joint-stock company form had proven itself in large part through
that great state trading organization. By mid-century, a general power of
incorporation was available to joint-stock companies. Fourteen months after the
Companies Registration Act of 1844 was enacted, ten times the previous number of
joint-stock companies had been provisionally registered. 46
By the nineteenth century the public/private distinction was crystallizing.4 7
Perhaps surprisingly then, it saw a renewed attraction to the corporate form as a
method of political and trade expansion. "More than 75 percent of British
acquisitions south of the Sahara were acquired by chartered companies." 48 The
most ambitious of these was Cecil Rhodes British South Africa Company 1889.
The chartered company had already proven itself as a revenue saving method of
colonization. By the nineteenth century, there were additional advantages in
maintaining "informal" empires. John Westlake described the State trading of
enterprises in the 1890s as "mediate sovereigns., 49 Their ambiguous status served
the interests of the chartering state well and had the effect of portraying the colonial
encounter as an encounter between "equals." Trade was a pure and liberal endeavor

06. See also ERIC STOKES, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS AND INDIA (1959). For the younger
Mill's views, see generally JOHN STUART MILL, WRrrINGS ON INDIA (John M. Robson et al.
eds., 1963) (1828-71).
43. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 113.

44. Id. at 114. The trading of corporate shares continued until the passing of the 1844
Registration Act. Id.
45. LINDLEY, supra note 12, at 99-100; KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 29, at 110-12 (placing
the "informal empire" of British overseas dominance as spanning the period 1815-1870).
46. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 281. Some 1639 companies were provisionally registered
under the Registration Incorporation and Regulation of Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844
during that period. Id.
47. See generally MICHAEL TAGGART, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN
VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE STORY OF EDWARD PICKLES AND THE BRADFORD WATER SUPPLY

(2002) (detailing the absence of an abuse of rights doctrine in English tort law). The liberal
distinction made in the United States cases of Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat) 518 (1819) and Proprietorsof Charles River Bridge v. Proprietorsof Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) was not observed in England. HARRIS, supra note 2, at
113.
48. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 29, at 117.
49. JOHN WESTLAKE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW

196-97 (L. Oppenheim ed., 1914 ).
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as compared with the more expensive and already sometimes odious practices of
colonization. Consequently, informal empire was often preferred to formal empire.
During this second wave of "colonization by trading company," in the
nineteenth century, public imperium and private dominium had established
themselves as separate categories in international law. As a consequence, the use of
the corporate form affected how property was conceived within the colonial
encounter. Colonial enterprises were not only the "principal engines of [trade] and
organisers of the overseas settlements, 50 they effectively prevented the European
law of nations from applying to the colonies. The colonies required different
standards since it was not the states themselves that were confronting each other,
but rather their corporations. Wars between rival corporations could be waged
5
abroad without necessarily engaging the European powers in hostilities at home. 1
A separate flexible law of nations developed: not a universal law of nations, but a
separate French, English, or German colonial law. 2 This prevented transfer to the
colonial sphere of the European concept of the nation state, sovereignty, and
central to the
territorial borders.53 The concept of natural frontiers, which was
54
European concept of nationhood, would not apply in the colonies.
Because the legal nature of corporations was not determined by international
law, but rather by national or colonial law, the status of the different corporations
varied. For example, "[t]he French nation was constitutionally prevented from
delegating sovereignty to private entities."5 5 Such was the disjunction between the
law of nations and the law of national corporations, that some international lawyers
at the time argued that these corporations should be treated as subjects of
international law. The orthodox position that they were merely delegates (however
tenuous at times) of their parent states, nevertheless prevailed.56
What about the relationships between the European corporations and the
indigenous inhabitants? The legal framework tended to portray the encounter as a
clash between individuals. A state trading corporation could acquire land and trade
from indigenous peoples as if it were a purely private person. Only later when the
company's assets were taken over by the state did that transaction engage legal
conceptions of sovereignty. British colonial law recognized minimal occupational
rights of the indigenous peoples. 57 These flowed from natural law ideas about
universal rights and ideas of the "noble savage." The level of recognition, however,
seemed to vary according to the colonizers' perception of the state of "civilization"

50. GREWE, supra note 20, at 298. Grewe puts it strongly when he states, "Their very
function was to prevent the transfer of the concept of the state to the non-European world."
Id. at 302.
51. Id. at 303; LINDLEY, supra note 12, at 99 ("The British East India Company was
certainly a sovereign Power so far as the native states of India were concerned... making
war . . . with the Portuguese Dutch and French-on occasions when the respective
governments in Europe were at peace . .
52 GREWE, supra note 20, at 298.

53. Id. at 302.
54. Id.
55. KOSKENNIEMi, supra note 29, at 144.
56. Id. at 122. One successful instance of achieving recognition for a corporation was
the 1884 recognition by the United States Senate of the Association Internationale du
Congo-a state founded by a private individual. Id. at 122-23.
57. See generally Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
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of the indigenous peoples. 58 In most cases, these were recognized only as private
rights that fell far short of imperium or sovereignty. In many such cases, the rights
were so "personalized" and "individualized" that the common law even imposed
restrictions on the alienability of land holdings by indigenous peoples. 59 The fate of
populations then, depended a great deal on whether they belonged to legally
cognizable collectivities. Whether individuals were capable of collective abstract
perpetual property holding determined how "public" their existence could be. The
joint-stock holders, of course, had long enjoyed such a corporate status by
operation of law. Corporations were, relatively at least, more "public" in this sense
than many indigenous populations.
While the blurring of imperium and dominum was to the advantage of the
colonizer in the seventeenth century, the distinction between imperium and
dominium was avowedly to the colonizing corporation's advantage in the
nineteenth. They could own property as a collectivity and in perpetuity, could avoid
entanglement with international territorial principles, and could pretend to equality,
as individuals rather than sovereigns, within the encounter.
Formal colonization followed, at which point the state would often take over
such land as had been acquired by the corporation and engage notions of imperium.
The reasons for formalizing empire were many and various and there is not space
to go into them here. In sub-Saharan Africa, it became increasingly difficult for
trading companies to use their moral suasion to end slavery in the territories. 60 It
meant something different for a corporation rather than a state to be engaged in
such a dialogue. In other countries, such as New Zealand, formal colonization by
England was adopted
for the purpose of preempting the claims of European rivals
61
for the territory.
Even when formal colonization was the preferred method, where the colonial
encounter was with a state rather than a corporation, and even when formal treaties
were entered into, contemporary international lawyers did not view all colonized
peoples as enjoying the status of "states." Treaties were often considered as merely
political agreements calculated to ease transition and compliance and having no
legal force. 'Treaties" with "ignorant Chiefs" were regarded as incapable of either
creating or transferring "sovereignty." 62 European international lawyers viewed
such treaties as merely creating private rights that the sovereign should honor.63

58. Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 44-45 (1999); see also

McHugh, supra note 18, at 33-34. In India, preexisting government was recognized and the
Mughal's consent was sought or inferred. Id.
59. E.g., Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
60. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 29, at 116-21.
61. The French and Americans were potential rivals. See generally CLAUDIA ORANGE,
AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI (1987) (providing history of the
treaty).
62. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 29, at 138. See also Anghie, supra note 58, at 7. In the
case of New Zealand, see Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington [1877] 3 N.Z.L.R. 72 (holding
that so far as it purported to cede sovereignty over New Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi
1840 was "a simple nullity").
63. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 29, at 138 (citing Westlake and Rolin). See also
Joravarsingji v. Sec'y of State for India, 51 Ind. App. 357 (P.C. 1924); Oyekan v. Adele, 2
All E.R. 785 (P.C. 1957).
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Only one side of this transaction had sufficient legal personality to treat, or to
enjoy, sovereignty. 64
In New Zealand, Maori post-184065 were considered without capacity to
alienate property to anyone but the colonizing State. This was both the common
law position and given effect by treaty.66 Accordingly, the colonial government
bought land cheaply and sold off land to settlers
for vast profits. In this way, the
67
Maori people effectively funded settlement.
II.

MODERN RELEVANCE

This is a rich history that requires retelling because most modern international
law and company law texts tend to forget about the role of the trading enterprise.
Are there broader lessons that we can draw from this history for today?
A. From a Colonized PeoplesPerspective:
The ideology and rhetoric of the "new" world order shares much with the
ideology of the nineteenth century. Britain's choice of contact via trading
corporations rather than direct imperial force in the nineteenth century was based
on liberal values and a belief in the value of free trade-just as it is today. From a
colonized peoples' point of view it did not, and still does not, so much matter
whether they are engaged in an encounter between states or transnational
corporations because the effects of such encounters have been, and still are, pretty
much the same. This is not because concepts of public or private do not matter but
rather because, as they have evolved, they have been applied to the colonized
peoples' disadvantage. The new world economic order is built on this colonial
legacy.
Conceptions about the public and private aspects of property have been central
to the experience of colonization by the colonized. Both the fusion of imperium and
dominium (sovereignty and ownership) in the early seventeenth century, and the
separation of them in the nineteenth century served the colonizers. Ownership and
sovereignty (or governance) are now treated differently again by the international
economic order. After having perhaps only recently acquired nation state status or
sovereignty, new nations are being "encouraged" to privatize ownership of
strategic national assets to relinquish the control and power that comes from

64. The requirement of the "intention to create legal relations" was not declared in
contract law until the nineteenth century. See J. BEATSON, ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 70
n.271 (27th ed. 1998). Presumably the more exacting legal formalities for "international
contracts" such as treaties than for domestic contractual arrangements, during earlier times,
effectuated the conduct of trade.
65. The Treaty of Waitangi refers in the English text to individual Chiefs, and in the
Maori text to Chiefs and their families. Treaty of Waitangi, Feb. 6, 1840, Eng.-N.Z., at

http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/about/treatyofwaitangi/treatyofwaitangi.asp

(English

Text) (last visited Jan. 28, 2004); and http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/about/treatyof
waitangiltreatyofwaitangimaori.asp (Maori Text) (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
66. Treaty of Waitangi, supra note 65, art. UI.(English Text) See also R. v. Symonds
[1847] N.Z.P.C.C. 387 (holding that at common law the State is the only source of private
title).
67. Stuart Banner, Conquest by Contract: Wealth Transfer and Land Market Structure
in ColonialNew Zealand, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 47, 47 (2000).
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dominium. At the same time, imperium or sovereignty is increasingly being
subordinated to dominium. There are prohibitions on nationalization of private
capital or assets.6 8 Deregulation is being urged. Pressure is being brought to bear to
allow foreign capital to flow readily into (and out of) their territory. 69 That pressure
comes through public and mixed public and private means-just as it always has.
Sovereignty does not mean for new nations what it used to mean for those in the
old European family of nations. While the meanings that we are prepared to give
contemporary encounters may be different, the experience by the developing world
of the transnational corporation may be very much the same as it has always been.
The formal equality presently enjoyed by new entrants to the family of nations
has at its background this colonial history. The power to enter legally enforceable
treaties now central to the world order was denied colonized peoples at the most
critical point of encounter. Even within the current system of formal equality, the
experience of multilateralism by some states continues to be very different from
that experienced by others.
For colonized peoples, trading corporations and the state may be
interchangeable in terms of their effects if not in the meanings attributed to such
encounters and the legal categories concerned. As Alexandrowicz says:
[T]he cooperation of companies of merchants with governments in the
international field offered an early example of the extension of the law
of nations from States to non-state entities-a significant anticipation of
present day developments in international law which tends
to abandon
70
the character of an exclusively inter-State legal system.
Corporations, then as now, were not incidental to international relationships but
rather key drivers of such relationships. The public/private distinction has been far
from fixed throughout this period. The very "publicness" of corporations once gave
them a relative advantage over individualized peoples. Now claims to the very
"privateness" of corporations are used to resist the aims of "new" governments.
For most of the rest of us, the narratives that this Article has offered bear little
or no relevance to how we currently think about corporations and their
relationships to states. For well over a century, we have ceased to regard corporate
status as a privilege derived from the state. To achieve corporate identity, all that is
required is to meet formal registration requirements-anywhere in the world. How
quaint it would be to suggest to a corporate lawyer that she is studying the law of
the King! Monopoly status is now recognized as "a" if not "the" main problem with
corporations. 71 Rather than exercising sovereign powers, or powers derived from
the state, we tend to think of corporations (and even transnational corporations) as

68. PETER MUCHINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 502-14 (1995).
See also David Schneiderman, NAFTA 's Taking Rule: American ConstitutionalismComes to
Canada, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499, 501 (1996) (discussing NAFTA prohibitions on
nationalization).
69. See generally JOSEPH E.

STIGLrrz, GLOBALIZATION AND rrs DIsCONTENTs (2002).
70. C.H. ALExANDROWICZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS

IN THE EAST INDIES

28 (1967).

71. Adam Smith disapproved of the joint company form, and the East India Company
particular, precisely because he associated them with monopoly power. HARRIS, supra

in
note 2, at 205. He thought that the monopoly joint stock form was suitable in limited areas,
for example, in banking, insurance, canals, and water supplies. Id. at 210.
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having the rights, powers, and duties of natural persons (together, of course, with
limited liability).
B. Another Lost Narrative
Why, then, this seeming disjuncture between the narrative and modem
corporate law? Transnational corporations such as the British East India Company
sometimes rate a mention as progenitors of the modem corporation in the literature,
but most contemporary histories of the corporate form tend to ignore or marginalize
them for the very reason that they seem to contemporary eyes to have mixed public
and private motives-to be some kind of "special case." Most transnational
corporations were primarily instruments for private profit and for trade. Their
charters also gave them other goals and motives (and the sovereign powers with
which to fulfill these). Having these mixed motives almost by definition seems to
have taken them out of the narrative of the historical development of the business
enterprise. This Article suggests that the mixture of functions was not anomalous
but rather central for that period, and one of the reasons for using the corporate
legal form in the first instance. Indeed, every corporation was required to make a
case to Parliament or the Crown that
72 it fulfilled a "public purpose" in order to
receive the privilege of incorporation.
These days, corporations with mixed public and private motives or
characteristics enjoy an aberrant and obscure status. State-owned or Statecontrolled corporations are more abundant than we tend to think--even in the
United States. 73 Banks are still in a special category requiring state and federal
charters-just as Adam Smith originally recommended. With those special charters
come special obligations. Characterizing these mixed business forms as hybrids, or
anomalous or special cases has had the effect of enhancing the "private" status of
all other business corporates: "real" corporations have no similar connection to
states or public purposes. The dominant contemporary view that only the aberrant
or suspect corporations are strongly connected to states is ahistorical if nothing
else. "Public" and "private" were never fixed categories.
The idea that corporations generally are creations of the state (the concession
theory) is largely suppressed today by the more popular explanatory power of law
and economics. The scholars of law and economics have tended to regard contract
as the basis of the corporation-and the other incidents of incorporation as devices
to reduce transaction costs. 74 Economic historians have found evidence that
unincorporated associations over time acquired many of the advantages of formal

72. For the parallel notion of "public purpose" protection in expropriation law, see
Michael Taggart, Expropriation, Public Purpose and the Constitution, in THE GOLDEN
METWAND AND THE CROOKED CORD: ESSAYS ON PUBLIC LAW IN HONOUR OF SIR WILLIAM
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73. See Jack M. Beerman, The Reach of Administrative Law in the United States, in
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Transaction Cost Approach, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 39 (Paul Burrows &

STRUCTURE

Cento G. Velanovski eds., 1981).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:363

incorporation-partly due (in Britain) to the eventual capitulation by the common
law courts to the needs of business enterprise. 7
These arguments are partial and not entirely convincing. As a legal fiction, the
contractual explanation for the corporation is at least as artificial as the idea that the
corporation is the creation of states. The notion that a corporation is the aggregation
of contractual agreements between each and every one of its members stretches
credence-particularly given the number of corporate shareholders that now exist.
The "contractual" explanation is particularly blind to an organization's size.
More fundamentally, such contractarian explanations tend to assume that law
responds to and reflects economic and political reality. If the law so accurately
reflects economic reality, why is it that subsidiaries are conceived as separate legal
entities when one would consider them part of a single economic entity if viewed
as a purely economic phenomenon? By this fragmentation, economic entities are
able to enjoy tax advantages and isolate liabilities. Each group member is
responsible for its own debts even if its low level of capitalization is explicable
only in terms of its relationship with the parent company. Group members can
sometimes even take advantage of their separate personality by gaining priority
against other creditors in the event of the insolvency of a subsidiary. This looks
quite different from what natural persons or even collections of natural persons can
do.
Legal personality, as this narrative has portrayed it, is not a wholly
autonomous legal conception but neither is it completely responsive to social or
economic factors. It is the product of positive and not natural law-though
sometimes natural law arguments have been successfully used to inform its
incidents. Ultimately the law decides who gets legal personality and status: there is
nothing spontaneous about it. The history of the corporate form in both its public
and private incarnations tells a much more complicated story of internal and
external resistance to new legal forms, instrumentalism, and exploitation. Not all
collectivities that we would regard as existing as a matter of social, political, or
economic fact have received legal personality.
In international law too, some peoples have enjoyed legal personality as
collectivities, while others have not. Depending on the circumstances, the absence
of legal personality can be a marker of both power and relative powerlessness. In
fact, some collectivities, which exhibit enormous power, do not enjoy legal status.
The WTO, for example, has no legal personality (as protestors found when they
attempted to sue it). Lack of legal status can render a group above the law-at least
as far as it purports to act as a unified autonomous entity. 76 At the same time, as
these new sites of power are emerging, nation states are being required to submit to
international fora and rules as they have never had to before. Greater obligations

75. See HARRIS, supra note 2; Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, The Myth of
the Corporationas a Creation of the State, 3 INT'L REv. L. & EcON. 107 (1983); Henry N.
Butler, GeneralIncorporationin Nineteenth Century England: Interaction of Common Law
and Legislative Processes,6 INT'L REv. L. & EcON. 169 (1986).
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challenges presented by mixed state and non-state actors, see Philip Alston, The Myopia of
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towards non-state "persons" and fewer freedoms now attach to a state's
international juristic personhood.
The contractual explanation will not do either as an implicit point of
distinction between public and private power. We can find political philosophers,
such as John Locke, who propose just such a contractual rationale for the state
itself. States and corporations have always been rivals-and have always borne
uncomfortable similarities to each other. Hobbes famously and pejoratively
described the relationship of corporations to states-as "lesser Common-wealths in
the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a natruall man. 77 The
narrative shows that states indeed have made corporations (lesser commonwealths)
but in a different sense corporations have very much helped to make or create
states. Twiss in 1884 described it thus: "Colonization by private entities has been
the predominant form of western expansion since the sixteenth century and for this
purpose chartered companies and philanthropic associations had often been vested
with sovereign rights." 78 The ascendancy of the corporation did not bring the
demise of the European family of nations, but rather their expansion.
Modem day language and concepts attempt to distance the relationship
between corporations and states. The public/private distinction, understood in its
modem sense, effects this distance, as do the basic units of international law, and
the contractual explanation for business enterprise. We have not, however,
completely banished the connection between states and corporations. We still talk
about corporations being British, New Zealand or American-though it is not clear
what we mean by this. Are we referring to natural persons shareholders? That
cannot be completely the case because capital moves so freely that shareholders
may be anywhere. Are we talking about the place of incorporation? Again
sometimes, but often the place of incorporation is little more than happenstance.
Are we talking about communities of interests and national influence? If we are, it
is not clear whether the "problem" is that corporations are too partial to certain
nations or interests or not partial enough. Even though the contractual explanation
for the corporation is dominant we still seem to understand elements of the
concession theory even if we cannot fully articulate them. The natural persons and
the artificial persons are often very hard to tell apart.
CONCLUSION

None of this gives us any direct assistance on the question of how transnational
corporations should be regulated today. The hope is that the telling of this history
will remind us all how important our starting points are. If we start with a
contractual explanation for the corporation then we will tend to analogize a
company's rights and, more importantly its obligations, to those of a natural
person. If we start with the notion that corporations are created by states or by the
operation of law, that they are abstract persons, then we will be more likely to find
a space at least to talk about what a corporation's obligations should be.
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